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“WHOSE” GAME IS IT? SPORTS-WAGERING AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RYAN M. RODENBERG, ANASTASIOS KABURAKIS & JOHN T. HOLDEN*

I

N 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA), a statute designed to prevent the further spread of state-sponsored
sports-wagering.1 The statute’s language has the effect of granting a property
right to sports leagues, implicating the Constitution’s Intellectual Property
Clause.2 The Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress the authority: “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”3
In 2012, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League
(NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey
League (NHL), and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
(collectively “Sports Leagues”) brought suit against New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie seeking an injunction under PASPA to prevent the state from offering
regulated sports-wagering.4 The Department of Justice (DOJ) eventually joined
the Sports Leagues as an intervenor.5 The matter was eventually appealed to
the Third Circuit where a divided court ruled 2–1 in favor of the Sports
Leagues.6
PASPA’s section 3703—labeled “Injunctions”—includes the word
“whose,” which confers the ownership rights of “competitive game[s]” to the
Sports Leagues for enforcement purposes under the statute:
A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be commenced
in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney
General of the United States, or by a professional sports organization
or amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged to

* Rodenberg is an assistant professor at Florida State University. Kaburakis is an
assistant professor at Saint Louis University. Holden is a doctoral student at Florida State
University. This Article is based on a portion of the certiorari stage amici curiae brief
submitted by the authors. See Brief for Amici Curiae Ryan M. Rodenberg, Anastasios
Kaburakis, and John T. Holden in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari, Christie v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1246719.
1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012). In 1999, the Supreme Court discussed PASPA
briefly in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179–
80 (1999).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 2:12-cv-04947), 2012 WL 3191255.
5. See David Purdum, Feds to Step in on New Jersey’s Effort to Legalize Sports
Betting, THE SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://linemakers.sportingnews.com/sport/2013
-01-22/new-jersey-nj-sport-betting-law-dept-of-justice-doj-intervenes-chris-christie.
6. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2013).

(1)
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be the basis of such violation.7
This semantic choice, with the determinant word “whose,” confers ownership
rights of “competitive game[s]” to the Sports Leagues, as well as other
professional or amateur sports organizations, deputizing them to enforce the law
in the same manner as the DOJ.8 As a pronoun, the word “whose” is the
possessive form of the word “who” and is used as an adjective. The word
“whose” is defined as “a possessor” and “that which belongs to whom.”9
PASPA violates the Intellectual Property Clause for two distinct reasons.
First, the express grant of perpetual ownership rights with characteristics
mimicking both patents and copyrights runs counter to various prongs of the
Intellectual Property Clause, including the “limited Times,” “Authors and
Inventors,” and “Writings and Discoveries” requirements.10 Second, conferring
perpetual property rights to states exempted under PASPA’s grandfathering
provision violates the Intellectual Property Clause’s “limited Times”
requirement.11 The focus of this paper is on the former.
In a September 24, 1991 letter, the DOJ raised a number of concerns in
connection with a then-Senate bill, S. 474, which would become PASPA.12
Two concerns predominated. First, the DOJ flagged a number of provisions in
S. 474 that raised “federalism issues.”13 Second, the DOJ found it “particularly
troubling that S. 474 would permit enforcement of its provisions by sports
leagues.”14 The DOJ’s concerns were ignored.
PASPA was enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause.15
However, the conferral of property rights under the straightforward language in
section 3703 implicates the Intellectual Property Clause.16 When Congress
granted ownership of “competitive game[s]” to the Sports Leagues as a
mechanism to deputize the Sports Leagues for purposes of PASPA
enforcement, such conferral took the functional form of a patent with ancillary
characteristics common to a copyright. This gave the Sports Leagues the right
to exclude sports-wagering otherwise permissible under state law.17 By virtue

7. 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (emphasis added).
8. See id.
9. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1352 (10th ed. 1993), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/whose.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. See id. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
12. See Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 24, 1991).
13. See id.
14. Id. The federalism issues were at the center of the petitions for writ of certiorari in
Christie. The intellectual property implications were addressed in the amici curiae brief of the
authors. See Brief for Amici Curiae Ryan M. Rodenberg, Anastasios Kaburakis, and John T.
Holden in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at 4–22, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1246719 [hereinafter Brief for
Amici Curiae Rodenberg, Kaburakis, & Holden].
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012).
16. See id.
17. The Supreme Court has provided an overview of the characteristics and remedies
afforded to both patent and copyright holders. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
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of the language used in PASPA’s property rights conferral, the statute is within
the purview of the Intellectual Property Clause and therefore must comply with
the Clause’s express limitations.
The Sports Leagues have cited the property rights granted by PASPA.18
The Sports Leagues posit that they have a proprietary interest in “the degree to
which others derive economic benefits from their own games . . . .”19 The
Sports Leagues also contend that they “have an essential interest in how their
games are perceived and the degree to which their sporting events become
betting events.”20 The Sports Leagues further reference “legally protected
interests of the organizations that produce the underlying games.”21 These
recognitions of ownership by the Sports Leagues lend further support to a
finding that PASPA implicates the Intellectual Property Clause.
The Sports Leagues’ legal position on this point has also been supported by
the DOJ in this case.22 The DOJ claimed “PASPA does give the leagues a
protected legal interest that has been invaded by New Jersey’s authorization of
sports gambling . . . .”23 The DOJ explained its argument by drawing an
analogy to intellectual property law: “[T]he legal protection that PASPA
accords to sports leagues is similar to the protections traditionally afforded in
fields such as copyright and trademark law, where authors and companies are
given the right not to have their creative works exploited by other parties.”24
PASPA’s legislative history supports the arguments made by the Sports
Leagues and the DOJ. PASPA was debated in the Senate by the Subcommittee
on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks.25 The title of the statute itself reveals
PASPA’s intent and effect. PASPA stands for “Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act.”26 PASPA protects select professional and amateur
sports leagues from the perceived ills of regulated sports-wagering through the
allocation of ownership interests in “competitive game[s]” under section
3703.27 Congress anointed the Sports Leagues to sue for injunctive relief under
the statute in the same way patent holders and copyright holders can file suits to
protect their property interests.
When NBA commissioner David Stern testified in front of the Senate
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
18. See Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-967), 2013 WL 2904907.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 13–14.
21. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint at 1, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J.
2012) (No. 3:12-cv-4947), 2012 WL 4804067.
22. See Brief for Appellee United States of America at 17, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714, 13-1715) 2013 WL
2904910.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 22 n.7.
25. See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991)
[hereinafter Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling].
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 3701–04 (2012).
27. See id. § 3703.
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Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks on June 26, 1991, he
expressed his view on PASPA’s intended protection and on the overlap between
sports-wagering and intellectual property: “Conducting a sports lottery or
permitting sports gambling involves the use of professional sports leagues’
games, scores, statistics and team logos, in order to take advantage of a
particular league’s popularity; such use violates, misappropriates and infringes
upon numerous league property rights.”28
Congress enacted patent and copyright laws pursuant to the Intellectual
Property Clause.29 Patent law protection is granted for useful, novel, and nonobvious inventions.30 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) reviews
and grants patents.31 If approved, a patent permits the holder to exclude others
from claiming the invention for a period of usually twenty years.32 Patents
operate as a duly authorized monopoly for a limited duration of time. The
Sports Leagues did not obtain a formal patent from the USPTO in connection
with individual sporting events. Congress unilaterally granted a quasi-patent for
sports-wagering purposes via the language contained in section 3703 of
PASPA.33
Copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed . . . .”34 Copyright
categories are specifically enumerated and include literary works, musical
recordings, and movies.35 Sporting events are not included in the inclusive
list.36
Congress’s conferral of ownership interests over athletic events to Sports
Leagues functions as a monopoly and runs counter to Supreme Court
precedent.37 In Sony v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,38 the Court explained:
“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited
nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. . . . It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors . . . .”39 PASPA fails to
meet this standard in two ways. First, PASPA’s ownership privileges under
section 3703 attach to only “a professional sports organization or amateur sports
organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such
violation.”40 Second, PASPA’s purpose is wholly unrelated to the creative
activity of authors and inventors; instead, the statute seeks to control the spread

28. See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling, supra note 25, at 51 (testimony
of David J. Stern, Comm’r, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012).
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
38. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
39. Id. at 429.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012).
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of an activity deemed by Congress to be undesirable.41
With PASPA’s grant of a proprietary right to the Sports Leagues operating
as the functional equivalent of a patent, it is useful to gauge the scope of
Congress’s authority to grant patents. In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City,42 the Court made clear:
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict
free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement,
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must
“promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is the standard
expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.43
When juxtaposed with the Intellectual Property Clause’s requirements,
PASPA’s grant of a patent-like property right to Sports Leagues fails on
multiple counts. First, the power to exclude states from effectuating regulated
sports-wagering programs is unrelated to, and in direct conflict with, the
Intellectual Property Clause’s requirement that such grants “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”44 Scholars Paul Heald and Suzanna
Sherry have noted, “[a] corollary principle [of the Intellectual Property Clause]
demands that Congress initially direct exclusive grants to those who provide the
public with the new creation. Monopolies are not rewards Congress may grant
to favored special-interest groups.”45
Second, PASPA’s grant of property rights is perpetual, putting it at odds
with the “limited Times” requirement of the Intellectual Property Clause.46
Third, as detailed in National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc.,47 the Sports
Leagues do not qualify as “Authors” under the Intellectual Property Clause.48
The Second Circuit in Motorola ruled against the NBA and found the league’s
primary business was “producing basketball games with live attendance and
licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those games . . . .”49 Fourth, athletic events
do not constitute “Writings [or] Discoveries” under the Intellectual Property
Clause, given their purported spontaneous nature and accompanying uncertainty
of outcome.50
PASPA’s grant of copyright-like power to the Sports Leagues is equally
41. See id.
42. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
43. Id. at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119, 1164 (2000).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
48. See id.
49. Id. at 853.
50. In contrast to scripted television shows or quasi-sporting events such as
professional wrestling, the Sports Leagues supposedly do not participate in athletic events
using pre-arranged scripts or a rehearsed sequencing of game-level events.
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evident under section 3703’s “whose competitive game” language.51 In their
original complaint, the Sports Leagues posited that athletic contests are not
scripted, implicating the “Writings” requirement of the Intellectual Property
Clause and the “fixation” language in the Copyright Act of 1976.52 The Sports
Leagues argued that “the outcomes of collegiate and professional athletic
contests must be determined, and must be perceived by the public as being
determined, solely on the basis of honest athletic competition.”53 Unlike live
musicals, theatrical plays, and professional wrestling, honestly competitive
sports are unscripted, making them incompatible with copyright law’s
constitutional and statutory requirements.
Unlike the games’ telecasts and broadcasts, which have been found to be
copyrightable content, the games per se have not been definitively deemed
worthy of copyright protection.54 Indeed, as the Solicitor General recently
explained as amicus in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.55: “In some
circumstances, moreover, the initial ‘performance’ may be the act of
transmission itself. For example, when a television network broadcasts a live
sporting event, no underlying performance precedes the initial transmission—
the telecast itself is the only copyrighted work.”56 Additionally, the “whose
competitive game” wording of section 3703 creates the suspicion of a sui
generis Intellectual Property Clause violation by basing a property right granted
by PASPA to a concept that has no owner.57
PASPA’s conferral of property rights in section 3703 also highlights a
conflict between the Commerce Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause.58
According to professor Thomas Nachbar, “[t]he overwhelming view among
commentators is that the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits apply to all of
Congress’s powers and therefore that Congress may not look to other Article I,
Section 8 powers in order to avoid those limits.”59 The implications for the
Intellectual Property Clause’s external limitations on PASPA are profound.
Scholar Jeanne Fromer flags the issue generally as follows: “Since the late
twentieth century, Congress has increasingly reached beyond the [Intellectual
Property] Clause’s means to promote the [Intellectual Property] Clause’s ends,
51. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012).
52. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, supra note 4.
53. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4, at ¶ 5.
54. This issue has emerged as both an inter-circuit split as well as an intra-circuit split
within the Eighth Circuit. The Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit are largely at odds.
Compare Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997), with Morris
Commc’ns. Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit
cases include Nat’l Football League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986)
and C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d.
818 (8th Cir. 2007).
55. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
56. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828079.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012).
58. See id.
59. Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 272, 274 (2004).
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often asserting its expansive—and less limited—commerce and treaty
powers.”60
PASPA’s invocation of the Intellectual Property Clause is a novel
argument, one not addressed by the parties or other amici in the Christie
litigation.61
The other parties have focused their attention on anticommandeering principles contained within the Tenth Amendment and
arguments related to equal sovereignty.62 PASPA’s deputization of Sports
Leagues and embedded property rights to “competitive game[s]” under section
3703 have not been uniformly accepted in various federal courts.63 In addition
to the obvious First Amendment issues connected to the commodification of
news from sporting events, the judicial divergence on this issue yields
substantial doubt in regard to PASPA’s underpinnings and compatibility with
the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause.

60. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61
DUKE L.J. 1329, 1330 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
61. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation
and Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S.
Ct. 2866 (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1089088; Brief for Amici Curiae Rodenberg, Kaburakis, &
Holden, supra note 14; Brief of Amici Curiae States of West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming in Support of Petitioners, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct.
2866 (2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1089089.
62. See supra note 61.
63. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4.
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